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INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN WISCONSIN
HoN. OSCAR M. FRITz,
Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit of Wisconsin.
The late Judge Warren D. Tarrant served as Circuit Judge for the
Second Judicial Circuit of Wisconsin from January, i9o2, until he died on
May i4th, 1912.
On several occasions he delivered a lecture to the studentg of the College of Law of Marquette University on the subject of Instructions to
Juries in Wisconsin.
It would have been desirable to preserve that lecture, in printed form,
in its entirety. However, for the purpose of this publication some condensation has been necessary and references to subsequent decisions have been
added.

The propositions to which attention is directed are usually
applicable to civil trials and, in some respects, also to criminal
trials. Want of space forbids consideration of instructions which
are only applicable to particular causes of action or defenses.
Such instructions involve the application of most of the principles
of the substantive law, as well as the law of evidence.
In the language found in Vol. XI Encyc. of P1. and Pr. p. 56,
an instruction is an exposition of the principles of law applicable
to a case, or to some branch or phase of a case, which the jury
are bound to apply in order to render a verdict establishing the
rights of the parties in accordance with the facts proved. The
essential idea of a charge is that it is an authoritative exposition
of the law which the jury are bound by their oath and by moral
obligations to obey.
Under the old common law practice, still in some states, and
in the Federal Courts, it was, as stated by Chitty,
"The practice for the judge at nisi prius not only to state
to the jury all the evidence that has been given, but to comment on its bearing and weight and to state the legal rules
upon the subjects and their application to the particular case,
and to advise them as regards the verdict they should give."
This common law practice has been changed in many of the
states by statute so as to require the court to instruct the jury as
to the law of the case only, and, either peremptorily or at the request of either side, to reduce his charge to writing.
The Wisconsin statutory provisions relating to instructions,
which should be borne in mind, are Secs. 2853, 2854 and 2855.
They are as follows:

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

"Upon the trial of every action the judge presiding, shall,
before giving the same to the jury, reduce to writing and
give as written his charge and instructions to the jury and
all further and particular instructions given them when they
shall return after having once retired to deliberate, unless a
written charge be waived by counsel at the commencement
of the trial, and except that the charge or instructions may
be delivered orally when taken down by the official phonographic reporter of the court. Each instruction asked by
counsel to be given the jury shall be given without change
or modification, the same as asked, or refused in full. If any
judge shall violate any of the foregoing provisions or make
any comments to the jury upon the law or facts on the trial in
any action without the same being so reduced to writing or
taken down the judgment rendered upon the verdict found
on such trial shall be reversed upon appeal or writ of error,
upon the fact appearing. The judge shall require the phonographic reporter to take down all that he may say during
any jury trial to the jury or to counsel in their presence
of or concerning such cause." Section 2853.
"As soon as any such charge shall have been given the
same shall be placed and remain on file among the records
. and papers of the case in which it was given. When delivered orally and taken down by the reporter he shall immediately transcribe the same in long hand and file the
transcribed copy, without special compensation therefor."
Section 2854.
It is not error to omit to instruct the jury when no instructions
are requested by counsel.
Heppler vs. State, 58 Wis. 46, 49.
Stuckey vs. Fritsche, 77 Wis. 329.
In the latter case the court said:
"We are clearly of the opinion that this section (Section
2853) was enacted for the purpose of requiring the instructions, when given, to be given in writing, unless the giving
of them in writing was waived by the parties, and was not
enacted for the purpose of making it the duty of the trial
judge to instruct the jury in any and every case."
On the other hand, when the jury is instructed, but not upon
all points which counsel believe should have been covered, no
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error can be predicated on the omission of the court to instruct
upon such other points in the absence of a request to do so.
Pfister vs. Milw. Free Press Co., 139 Wis. 627, 662.
Swalm vs. Nor. Pac. R. Co., 143 Wis. 442,446.
Suess vs. Stearns L. Co., 143 Wis. 6o9, 613.
Instructions to the jury should be clear and explicit and to the
point, and so brief as to be emphatic.
Duthie vs. Washburn, 87 Wis. 231.
Instructions must not be inconsistent or repugnant.
Crilley vs. State, 20 Wis. 244.
Sears vs. Loy, 19 Wis. lO7.
Harringtonvs. Priest, lO4 Wis. 362.
A trial judge may use his own language in instructing a jury,
but where the supreme court has approved the phrasing of an
important rule, the better practice is to follow it.
Miller vs. State, 139 Wis. 57, 72.
"New and somewhat obscure and inaccurate methods of
phrasing a simple proposition of law should not be indulged
in.
Sufferling vs. Heyl Patterson Co., 139 Wis. 510, 519.
Grotjan vs. Rice, 124 Wis. 253, 258.
Instructions must not invade or encroach upon the province of
the jury,
Hawkins vs. Costigan, 21 Wis. 545.
The rule is, in its most rigorous sense, "that the court should
respond to the law and the jury to the facts."
Doty vs. Strong, i Pin. 313.
"A charge to the jury is not required to contain a discussion of the evidence in connection with legal propositions
applicable thereto, nor state any such proposition more
than once, nor adopt any particular phrasing of a proposition by counsel, nor is it advisable to state any such proposition in an argumentative way, and, of course, it is not
necessary to indulge in enlarging upon the importance of a
particular proposition in its moral or other aspects."
Jones vs. Monson, 137 Wis. 478, 488.
In Wolff vs. Carstens, 148 Wis. 178, 184, the court said:
"It is contended that the court erred in charging the
jury and thereby prejudicially affected the appellant's rights,
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in that the court usurped the functions of the jury by directing them what weight to give to evidence in the case, by
resolving conflicts in the evidence, by directing the jury how
such conflicts were to be decided, and by otherwise expressing opinions to the jury as to the credibility of witnesses
and what evidence should be considered as controlling upon
the issues, thus misleading the jury and usurping its functions. The charge covers twenty-nine pages of the printed
case and its context shows that it is properly subject to
criticism as being unnecessarily elaborate as to details, confusing in its effect, and in some of its parts as invading the
province of the jury by communicating to them the court's
opinion of the effect of the evidence on disputed issues of
fact. Nor can we approve the charge in its treatment of
the evidence by way of argumentation, which necessarily
conveyed to the jury the court's personal view of the weight
of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the probative force of evidentiary facts. This practice has the inherent objection of tending to lead the court to invade the
jury's function of determining the weight, probative effect,
and sufficiency of the evidence, and what inferences of fact
should be drawn from the evidence adduced. We cannot
escape the conviction that the court in this case, in portions
of its charge to the jury, invaded the functions of the jury
in these respects."
As the jury's attention is called to the issues, both of fact and
of law and their duty becomes apparent to take up these issues
in regular order for deliberation, there naturally arise the questions of burden of proof and preponderance of evidence. An
excellent definition of burden of proof and preponderance of evidence in civil cases is found in the case of Eichman vs. Buchheit,
128 Wis. 385, 388:

"Preponderance of evidence and burden of proof are not
the same thing, although they run into each other. By preponderance of evidence is meant the evidence which possesses greater weight or convincing power; by burden of
proof is meant the duty resting on the party having the
affirmative of the issue to satisfy or convince the minds of
the jury, by the preponderance of the evidence, of the truth
of his contention. It is not enough that his evidence is of
slightly greater weight or convincing power; it must go
further, and satisfy or convince the minds of the jury, before the burden of proof is discharged."
There is a more philosophical definition of these terms in
Anderson vs. Chicago Brass Co., 127 Wis. 273, following out the
22
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ideas suggested in Pelitiervs. C. St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 88 Wis.
521.

Comment on preponderance of evidence is found in the cases of,
Grotianvs. Rice, 124 Wis. 253.
Garske vs. Ridgeville, 123 Wis. 503.
Thomas vs. Paul, 87 Wis. 6o 7 .
Anderson vs. Brass Company, 127 Wis. 273.
Hupfer vs. National Distillery Co., 127 Wis. 3o6.
Preuss Co. vs. Logemann Co., 131 Wis. 122.
Eichman vs. Buchheit, 128 Wis. 385.
My practice is to instruct upon the convincing power of evidence somewhat in the following language:
"In determining the convincing power of evidence you
may take into consideration the knowledge and sources or
means of information of the several witnesses, the interest
or lack of interest of the witnesses, the candor or lack of
candor of the witnesses, the bias or lack of bias manifested
by them, the manner of testifying and the bearing of the
witnesses upon the witness stand and all the facts and circumstances that have been made to appear upon the trial."
Any similar form is appropriate.
Numerous instances of error in charging on these terms, the
convincing power of evidence, and the credibilty of witnesses, are
noted in the decisions in our state. Attention is called a few.
In Button vs. Metcalf, 8o Wis. 193, 196, the lower court charged
the jury on the question of the preponderance of evidence as
follows:
"You are to be satisfied by a fair preponderance of the
testimony. That is an expression that may mean considerable, and, it may not mean much, depending on how you
understand it; but in the final analysis it means this: What
do you think about it, having your minds guided by the
evidence ?"
The Supreme Court said (p. 197):

"While we should not, perhaps, feel constrained to reverse the judgment on this ground alone, were there no
other error in the case, we cannot resist the conclusion that
this definition of, 'preponderance of evidence', is too elastic
to be accurate. It tends to minimize the importance of the
rule, and lead the jury to believe that it in fact means little
or nothing."
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An instruction to the effect that the party upon whom rests the
burden of proof should satisfy the jury to a reasonable certainty
was criticised, but held not prejudicial in Allen vs. Murray, 87
Wis. 41. Subsequently in Pelitiervs. R. R. Co., 88 Wis. 521, 528,
the words "to a reasonable certainty" were held proper in such a
charge and were held to mean, as the court had previously held
in Beery vs. R. R. Co., 73 Wis. 97, "that the preponderance of
the evidence must convince their judgment of the truth of the
fact found,"-not that the proof must be clear and most satisfactory.
Recently, in Sullivan vs. R. R. Co., 167 Wis. 518, 527, it was contended that the omission of the words "to a reasonable certainty"
in such an instruction was error. The court held otherwise, saying
"the phrase 'with reasonable certainty' is mere surplusage when
used in such connection *and adds nothing to the statement that
the jury should be satisfied of the existence of a fact before it
can so find."
In Jones vs. Monson, 137 Wis. 478, error was assigned because the jury were instructed that the burden of proof was on
the plaintiff to "establish the facts essential to his cause of action
by a preponderance or greater weight of evidence." On this
point the Court (Marshall, J.) said:
"The point of attack is at the word 'establish', the claim
being that its use made the instruction fall short of informing the jury that it was necessary in order to entitle plaintiff
to a verdict for them to be satisfied by a preponderance of
the evidence of the existence of all the facts essential thereto.
The point is not well taken. True, it were better to use the
term so often sanctioned by this court, 'satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence,' or what is still better, in the
judgment of the writer, 'satisfied to a reasonable certainty
by a preponderance of the evidence'."
See also Thomas vs. Paul, 87 Wis. 6o7.
Guinard vs. Knapp, Stout & Co., 95 Wis. 482.
Williams vs. Hoehle, 95 Wis. 510.
Sufferling vs. Heyl Patterson Co., 139 Wis. 510, 517.
Schumacher vs. Tuttle Press Co., 14- Wis. 631, 639.
It may be well also to observe that ordinarily failure to instruct on burden of proof is not error when no instruction is
requested on the subject.
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Coppins vs. Jefferson, 126 Wis. 578.
Howard vs. Lumber Company, 129 Wis. 98.
McHatton vs. McDonnell's Est., 166 Wis. 323, 328.
It is error to instruct the jury that the burden of proof is on
both parties at the same time.
State ex rel Leonard vs. Rosenthal, 123 Wis. 442.

In civil cases all issues of fact are to be determined by the jury
upon the preponderance of evidence, and it is not necessary that
proof should satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as in

criminal cases.
Boring vs. Ott, 138 Wis. 260.
Kuenster vs. Woodhouse, I01 Wis. 216, 221.
Poertnervs. Poertner,66 Wis. 644, 647.
Quaife et ux vs. C. & IV.W. Ry Co., 48 Wis. 513.

In civil actions, except as to certain special issues, such as
fraud or criminal acts, the jury are required to be convinced or
satisfied of the existence of a fact by a preponderance of the evidence only, and it is error to charge that the evidence must be
clear and convincing.
Brennan vs. Healy, 157 Wis. 37.

However, in civil actions where one of the facts essential to a,
recovery also constitutes a crime or a fraud, the jury must be
satisfied of the existence of such fact by a clear and satisfactory
preponderance of the evidence.
Poertner vs. Poertner, 66 Wis. 644, 647.
Neacy vs. Supervisors, 144 Wis. 210.
Peterson vs. Lemke, 159 Wis. 353.
Trzbiatowski vs. Jereski, 159 Wis. 19o.
Kenese vs. Cudahy B. Co., 167 Wis. 378, 380.
Bechman vs. Salzer, 168 Wis. 277, 282.
Lange vs. Heckel, 175 N. W. (Wis.) 788.

It is not proper for a court to say to a jury that when one witness testifies on one side and another on the opposite side and the
two are equally credible, the testimony of a third necessarily
creates a preponderance on either side.
Ely vs. Tesch, 17 Wis.

202, 209.

In Langton vs. Hagerty, 35 Wis. I5O, the court refused to
charge the jury "that the testimony of the defendant was entitled
25
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to as much credit as that of any other witness," and commenting
on this as to the weight which ought to have been given the
testimony of the defendant, the Supreme Court said:
"The jury*-are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, the defendant included; and the court could not properly decide for them as to the weight of the defendant's
testimony, or that of any other witness in the case."
It is error to charge that if witnesses are equally credible, then
the greater number of witnesses on one side or the other would be
entitled to the greater weight.
Bierbach vs. Goodyear Rubber Co., 54 Wis. 208, 213.
"The question as to the credit which should be given to the evidence of the witnesses of the respective parties is one solely for
the jury."
Mechelke vs. Bramer, 59 Wis. 57, 58.
Poertnervs. Poertner,66 Wis. 644, 65o.
But is was held not erroneous for the Court to say:
"If the testimony of the plaintiff outweighs that of the defendant, if only enough to turn the scales, your verdict must be for
he plaintiff."
Telford vs. Frost,76 Wis. 172.
See also Spensley vs. Insurance Co., 62 Wis. 443, 452 and
Boyington vs. Sweeney, 77 Wis. 55.
It is error to instruct the jury to give greater weight to the
greater number of witnesses, with no qualifying charge as to maters of relative intelligence, interest, bias, prejudice, motive, etc.
Schmidt vs. Railway Company, 89 Wis. 195.
Hardy vs. Railway Company, 89 Wis. 183.
In Johnson vs. Superior Rapid Transit R. Co., 91 Wis. 233, the
court criticised the following instruction as erroneous:
"In passing upon the question of the credibility of witnesses, you will always consider, of course, any motives that
the witness may have for testifying the way he does. The
temptations to perjury,--you should always consider that.
You will always consider, of course, the character of the
witnesses, so far as you know it, as bearing upon the question of whether a witness would be truthful and reliable or
not. My observation is that pretty good persons sometimes
lie, and that PRETTY BAD persons sometimes tell the
truth."
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As to this the Supreme Court said (p. 237) :
"In determining the credibility of the several witnesses,
each juryman was thus directed to take into consideration
his own knowledge of the witness or witnesses; and, in addition to that, .the judge instructed the jury as to what his
own observations had been in regard to the truthfulness of
good and bad persons. As this court has repeatedly held:
'Every party to an action at law in this state has a right to
insist upon a verdict or finding based upon the law and
the evidence in the case, and not, in the absence of evidence,
upon mere inference, conjecture, and personal experience'."
Where facts have-been testified to by witnesses of apparent
intelligence and credibility who are in no way impeached or contradicted, but opposing counsel in his argument to the jury stated
that such facts did not exist, the court should, on request, instruct
the jury that these facts were uncontradictedand that they were
not at liberty to find to the contrary.
Davis vs. Railway Co., 93 Wis. 47o .
It is error in a case in which it is applicable to refuse to instruct to the effect that the number of witnesses and their concurrence in support of a given state of facts was a subject of
material importance in deciding their credibility, for the reason
that there was much less probability of two or more persons being
concerned in the same falsehood or being influenced by the same
mistake than a single individual.
Bisewski vs. Booth, IOO Wis. 383.
It is not error to say that the jury must decide the issue according to the weight of evidence, and not beyond reasonable doubt.
The court should refuse to charge as to the particular weight to
be attached to certain testimony and the presumption arising
from certain conduct of the parties.
Kuenster vs. Woodhouse, 10I Wis. 216.
It was held to be error for the court in a criminal case to say
to the jury that the evidence on the part of the state was sufficient
to convict, but on the part of the accused it was not sufficient to
entitle him to an acquittal.
Benedict vs. State, 14 Wis. 423.
It was error for the court to tell the jury that there seemed to
be an honest mistake in reference to certain testimony. The jury
should be told that it was their duty to harmonize the testimony
27
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if possible and that.the theory of honest mistake should be adopted
if possible rather than the theory of false swearing.
Petrichvs. Union, 117 Wis. 46.
It is apparent that the judge in saying that there seemed to be
an honest mistake in reference to certain testimony was invading
the province of the jury.
In Comanw vs. Wunderlich, 122 Wis. 138, it is said that the trial
judge should not give special significance to the evidence on one
side of the case, nor should he charge the jury to refresh their
memory as to the evidence on one side of the case. And in Sullivan vs. Mauston Milling Company, 123 Wis. 360, it is stated that
the judge should not rehearse the evidence.
The following cases illustrate what is permissible on this subject and what is erroneous:
Bodenheimer vs. Ry. Co., I4O Wis. 623.
Milwaukee S. T. & D. Co. vs. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 164 Wis.
298, 302.

Scheuer vs. Manitowoc M. T. Co., 164 Wis. 333, 342.
However, in Horr vs. Howard Co., 126 Wis. i6o, it was held to
be within the province of the trial judge to summarize the testimony on conflicting points, warning the jury that they must decide
according to their own memory of the testimony. The misstatements of the trial judge were held not prejudicial error, because
his attention was not promptly called thereto by counsel.
It is not unusual for parties to ask the court for instructions
upon the interest of parties or certain witnesses. In reference to
this it was held that the comment of the court on the plaintiff's
witness was proper in view of the fact that the court enjoined
the jury that a like test as he laid down should be applied to all
the witnesses.
Kavanaugh vs. Wausau, 120 Wis. 611.
But the evidence of one witness should not be singled out and
given prominence by special comment thereon.
In the Kavanaugh case it was held proper to instruct as follows:
"In judging of the credibility of plaintiff's evidence, you,
the jury, may properly consider his interest in the result of
the trial, the temptation under the circumstances to color
his testimony favorable to himself, and everything bearing
28
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on the subject, and give such evidence such weight only as
in your judgment it is entitled to, and that a like test should
be applied to the evidence of each witness who has testified
in this case."
Approved in Blankavag vs. Badger B. & L. Co., 136 Wis.
380.
See also Novak vs. Nordberg Mfg. Co., 141 Wis. 298.
However it would be error to omit the last part of this instruction to the effect "that a like test should be applied to the evidence
to each witness who has testified in this case," because then the
testimony of a single witness would have been called to the jury's
attention and made prominent.
It is very common to instruct the jury on the principle of
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. A proper instruction to the
jury is:
"If you find that any witness or witnesses have knowingly and 'wilfully testified falsely as to any material fact in
the case, you are at liberty to disregard all of the testimony
of that witness or witnesses not corroborated by other
credible evidence in the case."
In order that his uncorroborated testimony may be disregarded
by the jury, the witness must have knowingly and wilfully
testified falsely.
Little vs. Superior R. T. Co., 88 Wis. 402.
Mercer vs. Wright, 3 Wis. 645.
Morely vs. Dunbar,24 Wis. 185, 189.
Black vs. State, 59 Wis. 471.
As to when this instruction should be given and when it is error
to refuse it, see Pumorlo vs. Merrill, 125 Wis. 102:
"An exception is urged to the refusal of the court to give
the instruction as to the rule of 'Falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus.' To warrant the giving of such an instruction
there must be a sufficient basis in the evidentiary facts and
circumstances adduced as tends to show that there was wilfully false swearing. Whether such a rule applies to the
consideration of the evidence of a case is primarily a question for the trial court and not for the jury. It therefore
devolves upon the trial court, before ruling on such a request, to determine whether, under the facts and circumstances, there is any evidence tending to show that a witness
or witnesses whose evidence is to be submitted to the jury
29
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did wilfully swear falsely. In the determination of this
question the court must take into consideration that wilfully
false swearing is not to be imputed to a witness when it
clearly appears that discrepancies, conflicts, and contradictions in the evidence are manifestly honest mistakes, due to
faulty observation, imperfect recollection, or mistaken impressions of facts. The court must find something either in
the appearance, demeanor, or manner of a witness while
testifying, or such a conflict or contradiction between him
and the other witnesses in the case, or such an inherent incredibility in the facts testified to by him, as would reasonably tend to show that the witness wilfully swore falsely.
The decision of the question on the evidence by the judge
presiding at the trial is given much weight, due to his superior advantages for the observation of witnesses while
testifying, the understanding of the application of testimony
to the facts and circumstances of the case, .and the other
matters appearing on the trial which throw light on the
honesty and fairness of persons testifying."
See also Steber vs. C. & N. W. Ry., 139 Wis. io.
Allen vs. Murray, 87 Wis. 41.
The subject of admissions also frequently necessitates consideration.
Here is a good instruction on that subject:
"In weighing and considering the evidence in this case,
the admissions of a party tending to contradict or vary his
testimony may be considered by you, but evidence of casual
statements or admissions by a party in casual conversation
and to disinterested persons is universally considered as the
weakest kind of evidence that can be produced; yet this
dearly does not imply that an admission deliberately made
and proven beyond mistake does not have very great inherent force as evidence."
Dreher vs. Fitchburg,22 Wis. 675.
Knowlton vs. Railway Co., 59 Wis. 278.
Page vs. Sumpter, 53 Wis. 652.
Haven vs. Markstrum, 67 Wis. 493.
Sullivan vs. Mauston Milling Company,
Max vs. Wellington, 138 Wis. 6o7, 612.

123

Wis. 36o.

However, it must be noted that statements made by a party
under such circumstances as to be part of the res gestae are in
a separate and distinct class from admissions, which, when sub30
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sequently made, become mere recitals of a past transaction. "An
instruction applicable to one class is either too weak or too strong
for the other."
John vs. Pierce, 178 N. W. (Wis.) 297, 299.
Your attention is also directed to a few decisions on the subject
of positive and negative testimony. An instruction on this kind
of testimony is frequently asked for in the trial of negligence
cases, and usually on the part of the defendant.
For an instructive discussion of this subject see Anderson vs.
Horlicks Malted Milk Co., 137 Wis. 569, and also Bodenheimer
vs. Ry. Co., 14o Wis. 623.
Hildmann vs. Phillips, io6 Wis. 611.
Alft vs. Clintonville, 126 Wis. 334.
Roedler vs. Railway Company, 129 Wis. 27o.
Johnson vs. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 158 Wis. 56.
Luick vs. Krom, i77 N. W. (Wis.) 2o.
In Urbanek vs. Ry Co., 47 Wis. 59, 65, the Court said:
"It is true, as a rule, that negative testimony, or testimony of witnesses in the vicinity that they did not hear the
whistle at the time and place, is not as conclusive as the
testimony of the same number of witnesses that they did
hear it; but this rule may be greatly modified in a given
case, by circumstances-the character and interest of the
witnesses, their means of knowledge and manner of testifying, and other matters forming the test of credibility, which
the jury are presumed to have considered; and this court
might do great injustice by applying this rule as an inflexible
one, without these tests of credibility, and without reference
to modifying circumstances."
The following is an appropriate instruction on this subject:
"Positive testimony of a small number of witnesses that
they saw or heard a given thing occur, will outweigh the
negative testimony of a greater number of witnesses that
they did not see or hear it, provided the witnesses are
equally credible; but in connection with this instruction
should be considered the relative means or opportunity of
the several witnesses to see or hear the occurrence, and it
should be carefully kept in mind that it only applies when
the witnesses are equally credible."
31
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The instruction must not ignore the element of equal credibility of the witnesses, which is always to be included in an instruction upon this subject.
Luick vs. Krom, 177 N. W. (Wis.) 20.
Anderson vs. Horlicks M. M. Co., 137 Wis. 569.
On the other hand, the instruction as to negative testimony is
only proper when the testimony to which it is intended to be applicable is purely negative in character. It can be very misleading
if applied when the alleged negative testimony is merely negative
in form. See
Coel vs. Gr. Bay Tr. Co., 47 Wis. 229, 234.
Brown vs. T. M. E. R. & L. Co., 148 Wis. 98.
Marinette vs. Goodrich Transit Co., 153 Wis.

92.

And recently it has been held that an instruction on this matter
is subject to criticism if it fails to tell the jury what constitutes
negative testimony.
Luick vs. Krom, 77 N. W. (Wis.) 20.
Generally speaking, the instructions considered thus far are
applicable to both general and special verdicts, but there are some
principles to be considered in reference to special verdicts.
When a cause is submitted for a special verdict, the court
should instruct as tp each question so as to enable the jury to
answer it intelligently.
Baxter vs. Railway Co., 104 Wis. 307.

It is error for the court to instruct the jury as to the effect of
their answers, and where a requested instruction is presented to
the court care should be taken that error of this kind does not
vitiate it.
Musbach vs. Wis. Chair Co., io8 Wis. 57.
Banderob vs. Wis. Cent. R. Co., 133 Wis.
Christl vs. Hauert, 164 Wis. 624, 627.

249,

287.

Therefore, it is not advisable and not good practice to give
a general charge on the law of the case. It is not necessarily
error (Banderob vs. Wis. Cent. R. Co., supra;Miner vs. Rolling,
167 Wis, 213, 217) but it frequently leads to error. Reed vs
Madison, 85 Wis. 667.
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On the other hand, although a juror may thereby be informed,
in a way, as to the effect of an answer, it has been held proper
and it is customary to tell the jury, that if they answer certain
questions in a certain way they need not go any further, provided
the jury are instructed not to consider the effect of their answers.
Chopin vs. Badger Paper Company, 83 Wis. 192.
Banderob vs. Wis. Cent. R. Co., 133 Wis. 249, 288.

Sicard vs. Albenberg Co., 136 Wis. 622, 626.
Likewise, it is proper and quite necessary to instruct the jury
on burden of proof as to the various questions (Carle vs. Nelson,
145 Wis. 593, 598) and that is not error, even though the jury
are thereby informed as to the legal effect of their answers.
Illinois Steel Co. vs. Paczocha, 139 Wis. 23, 35.

The instructions which are given should be given appropriate
to each question and in immediate connection with the question
to which they apply. A failure in that regard is error.
Rhyner vs. Menasha, 107 Wis. 201.
Becker vs. West Side Dye Works, 177 N. W. 907.
Banderob vs. Wis. Cent. R. Co., 133 Wis. 249, 288.

Requested instructions should specify the particular question
of the verdict to which they are directed. Such requests may
properly be rejected if they are not directed to any particular
question.
Twentieth Cent. Co. vs. Quilling, 136 Wis. 481, 493.
Banderob vs. Wis. Cent. R. Co., 133 Wis. 249, 288.
In some circuits in Wisconsin it has become customary to give
the jury a copy of the instructions when they retire for deliberation. That practice was sanctioned in Hakenson vs. Neillsville,
152 Wis. 594.

The foregoing may seem to involve rather the labors of the presiding judge, than of the attorney at the bar. It may be timely to
allude to the tasks in relation to instructions that devolve upon
the trial lawyer.
His rights and duties are two-fold. To request the court to
give certain instructions which he believes necessary and the refusal of which will constitute error; and to take exceptions to
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such instructions as have been given which he believes to be erroneous, and to the court's refusal to give instructions which were
requested by counsel.
As to the first proposition, requests to instruct should be submitted in time to give the judge a fair and reasonable opportunity
to consider them. It is a fundamental rule that the instructions
which counsel desires should be submitted in writing.
A party waives any mere omission to instruct the jury upon
any given subject by failure to present in writing requests for
such instruction.
Taylor vs. Seil, 120 Wis. 32.
Fosha vs. O'Donnell, 120 Wis. 336.
Monaghan vs. N. W. Fuel Co., 140 Wis. 457, 462.
Brahmsteadt vs. Mystic Workers, 152 Wis. 580.
Landry vs. Webster Mfg. Co., 156 Wis. 248, 250.
Stwmm vs. W. U. T. Co., 140 Wis. 528.
McHatton vs. McDonnell's Est., i66 Wis. 323, 328.
Gerstein vs. Adams Co., 169 Wis. 504.
This rule has been stated in another way and in terms slightly
more liberal to the party desiring the instruction.
It is not error to refuse to give requested instruction when the
request was oral and. the party did not undertake to formulate the
instruction desired.
Hardt vs. Railway Company, 130 Wis. 512.
The principle is best stated in Hacker vs. Heiney, iii Wis.
313, on page 316:
"Error is assigned on failure of the court to give the
jury an instruction not reduced to writing, nor even to
words, but of which merely the general idea was suggested
orally by appellant. Specific error can be assigned only upon
refusal to give an instruction formally requested in writing.
Sec. 2853, Stat. 1898, evidently contemplates this protection
to the trial court in commanding that a requested instruction be given in its exact words or refusal in toto. Of
course, there may be issues so vital that omission of any
instruction whatever thereon is itself error unless excused
by a party's failure to call attention to it."
See also 99 Wis. 109; 101 Wis. 533.
However, where counsel had directed the court's attention to a
vital issue by duly suggesting a question for the special verdict,
which the court did not include in the form submitted, it was held
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that, "It was manifestly the duty of the court to give some instruction on its own motion, if it did not see fit to propound the
question requested by the defendant."
Wawrzyniakowski vs. Hoffman & B. Co., 146 Wis. 153,
168.
On the other hand, in a criminal case it was held that although
the accused cannot as a matter of strict legal right predicate error
on the refusal of an instruction orally requested, the Supreme
Court may, in its discretion, consider the point as raised.
Bradley vs. State, i42 Wis. 137.
Cupps vs. State, 120 Wis. 504.
Whether, when a party requests an instruction orally and
states that he desires to put it in writing, it would be error for
the court to refuse it because not presented in writing at the
time, may be an open question. The due administration of justice
would probably require that the party should be given time to
formulate his instruction in writing and present it to the court.
Bradley vs. State, 142 Wis. 137.
It is not error to refuse a requested instruction, when the
substance of the requested instruction is included or covered in
the charge given by the court.
Adams vs. Bucyrus Co., 164 Wis. 146, 150.
Scheuer vs. Manitowoc & N. T. Co., 164 Wis. 333, 342.
John DeWolf Co. vs. Harvey, i61 Wis. 535, 548.
Koenig vs. Sproesser, i6i Wis. 8, 11.
Williams vs. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 169 Wis. 26r.
Branegan vs. T. of Verona, 170 Wis. 137.
Olson vs. Lann, i7o Wis. io6.
It is not error to refuse to give an instruction which though
good law in the abstract does not apply to the question to which
it is directed, nor aid the jury in answering it.
Dolphin vs. Peacock Min. Co., i55 Wis. 439, 451.
Likewise, instructions which, though stating correctly an abstract rule of law, are not applicable to the case, are improper
and should be rejected.
Joannes vs. Millerd, go Wis. 68.
McHatton vs. McDonnell's Est., i66 Wis. 323,

327.
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It is error to tell the jury that they may use an instruction
as far as it is applicable.
Guinard vs. K. S. & Co., go Wis. 123.
Sec 2853 Wis. Stats. provides that:
"Each instruction asked by counsel to be given to the
jury shall be given without change or modification, the same
as asked, or refused in full."
The correctness of instructions must be determined by taking
them as a whole and not by detached and disconnected parts.
Sterling vs. Ripley, 3 Pinney, 155.
Gagen vs. Dawley, 162 Wis. 152, 156.
Green vs. Appleton W. M., 162 Wis. 145, 151.

And when an instruction is good in part and bad in part,
the court need not modify it but may refuse it altogether.
In preparing requests for instructions, it must also be remembered that there is a distinction between a requested instruction and the charge of the court as a whole. A requested instruction must be full and complete in itself. Not so with the
charge by the court.
In Buchman vs. Jeffery, 135 Wis. 448, 454, the court said, in
speaking of the necessity for a proposed instruction to be full
and complete:
"But that was predicated upon the statutory requirement
that the instruction must be full and correct in itself, so that
the court can properly give it in the exact words of the request, in order that error may be predicated upon its rejection. Of course, no such strict rule applies to the charge of
the court. He may convey one idea or one element of the
rule of law in one portion of his charge, disassociated from
other portions or elements, so long as those other elements
are in fact conveyed to the minds of the jury as necessary
to be found by them."
"The giving of instructions so worded as to be difficult
to understand and as to admit reasonably of a construction
that would mislead the jury is sufficient ground for reversal."
Attention should also be called briefly to the matter of exceptions. Necessity for exceptions arises in two respects. As to instructions which have been given which are considered improper
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and prejudicial; and as to refusals to give instructions which have
been requested.
It was formerly the rule that exceptions to the refusal of the
court to give instructions asked for had to be taken at the trial or
they were deemed to have been waived.
Firmeis, vs. State, 61 Wis. 14o.
That is still, generally, the rule in the federal courts both as
to requests which are refused and as to instructions which have
been given. There counsel must follow the charge closely as it
is given by the judge and then note their exceptions on the
record before the jury begins its deliberations. Failure to do so
promptly, constitutes waiver of the error and will not be ground
for reversal unless the trial court submitted the case upon quite
an erroneous theory.
However, in the courts of Wisconsin exceptions to the charge
can be taken at any time before the close of the term at which
the action is tried. Sec. 2869 Wis. Stats.
Under that statute it has been held that a refusal to give
requested instructions cannot be reviewed on appeal unless exceptions are taken thereto and preserved in the bill of exceptions.
Stubbings vs. Curtis, 1O9 Wis. 307.
Although Chapt. 267, Laws of 1903, (Sec. 2405 Wis. Stats.)
provides that, under certain circumstances, the failure to take
proper exceptions may be disregarded by the Supreme Court,
that
"statute should not be construed as inviting the abandonment of taking exceptions. * * * It does not follow that,
because a case would be reversed on an exception taken, it
will be reversed under this statute without an exception.
The trial court is entitled to know what fault is found with
its charge, so that it may set the verdict aside if convinced
that prejudicial error has been committed. The opposite
party has a right to know, so that he may consent to a new
trial if he is satisfied that error has been committed and
wishes to save the delay and expense that would result from
an appeal to this court."
Peterson vs. Lemke, 159 Wis. 353, 355.
In the earlier case of Pfister vs. Milw. Free Press Co., 139
Wis. 627, which was also decided subsequent to the enactment of
Chapt. 267, Laws of 19o3, but without referring to that statute,
the Court, at p. 662, had said:
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"This court has uniformly refused to reverse judgments
for erroneous instructions where no exception was taken
thereto, and has likewise refused to reverse judgments because of failure to instruct where no request for instruction
was made."
The following are a few of the rules which must be remembered in taking exceptions to instructions.
An exception to the instructions on the ground that they do
not embrace all the questions at issue is not sufficient where a
party desires instructions on issues other than the one instructed
on.
Newton vs. Whitney, 77 Wis. 515.
An omnibus exception to an instruction to the jury, which
includes several propositions, some of which are correct, is insufficient to present the correctness of any one of them.
Sheppard vs. Rosenkrans, 109 Wis. 58.
Dehsoy vs. Railway Co., 1I0 Wis. 412.
A general exception to the whole of the charge is not available if any distinct and independent proposition covered by it is
proper.
Flanniganvs. Stauss, 131 Wis. 94.
Richardson vs. Babcock, 119 Wis. 141.

Likewise an omnibus exception to the refusal to give the entire number of instructions which had been requested, and many
of which were inapplicable, is not available.
Haueter vs. Marty, 15o Wis. 490, 495.

It happens occasionally that after some deliberation the jurors
find that they differ as to their understanding of the court's instructions and they desire to have them re-read.
On the subject of re-instructing a jury, Sec. 2855, Wis. Stats.,
provides:
"When a jury, after due and thorough deliberation upon
any cause, shall return into court without having agreed on
a verdict, the court may state anew the evidence or any part
of it and may explain to them anew the law applicable to
the case, and may send them out again for further deliberation; but if they shall return a second time, without having
agreed on a verdict, they shall ask from the court some
further explanation of the law."
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When instructions are to be repeated or further instructions
are to be given, the clerk, the reporter, and counsel ought to be
present.
However, as regards the reporter, it has been held that for
the judge to repeat portions of his charge from memory, his reporter having gone home, is not error.
Gibbons vs. Wisconsin Valley Railway Co., 66 Wis. 166.
So also, where the jury returned to the juryroom and the
court gave additional instructions during the temporary absence
of the reporter, and appellant's counsel, having noticed the absence of the reporter, did not call the court's attention to it, but
relied on it as error, it was held that the error was not material,
or if material was waived by the appellants.
Stringham vs. Cook, 75 Wis. 589.
As regards the presence of the attorneys in the case, the court
said in Meier vs. Morgan, 82 Wis. 289:
"We know of no rule which requires the court, in a civil
case, to send for counsel when a jury desires further instruction. It is better practice to procure the attendance of
both counsel, but, in the absence of anything to show that
the defendants were prejudiced by it, we see no room for a
claim of error."
In Walczckowski vs. T. M. E. R. & L. Co., 157 Wis. 191, 194,
the court said:
"Counsel for plaintiff were not present when the jury
was reinstructed.* * * If counsel voluntarily absent themselves from court after the jury has been sent out to deliberate upon their verdict, the court is under no obligation
to either send or wait for them before reinstructing the
jury or receiving their verdict. Such a rule would in many
cases seriously and needlessly hamper trial judges in the
discharge of their duties. Where, however, their attendance
can be procured without unreasonable delay, it is better practice to do so. Meier vs. Morgan, 82 Wis. 289; Hurst vs.
Webster Mfg. Co., 128 Wis. 342."
As the last word in instructions to a jury would be in relation to their duty to return a verdict when they have difficulty
in agreeing, it will be appropriate to conclude with a reference
to that subject.
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In Barlow vs. Foster, 149 Wis. 613, a jury reported, after
29 hours deliberation, that an agreement was impossible. The
court instructed as follows:
"I see no reason, why you gentlemen are not just as
competent, just as able, just as likely to decide the case, and
decide it right, as the next jury that would be called upon
the case would be.
"Now I do not want you to understand by what I say
that you are going to be made to agree or you are going
to be kept out until you do agree, that is not the idea, but I
do want you to understand it is your duty and you must
make an honest and sincere effort to arrive at a verdict.
Jurors should not be obstinate; they should be open-minded;
they should listen to the arguments of others and talk matters over fully and fairly and freely and make an honest
effort, as fairminded men, to come to a conclusion."
Regarding those directions, Justice Marshall said:
"As regards the admonitions to the jury, they were well
within the administrative authority of the judge. A trial
judge may properly admonish a jury of the importance,
from a public as well as a private standpoint, of using their
best endeavors to arrive at a harmonious conclusion based
on judgment. To awaken or strengthen their appreciation of
duty, they may well be admonished, substantially, as the
trial judge did here,-the idea being kept prominent, as it
was, that no effort was being made to coerce anyone to surrender his deliberate honest judgment, but only to secure
the best possible consideration of the matter in hand the jury
are capable of."
See also Jackson vs. State, 91 Wis. 267.
Hand vs. Agen, 96 Wis. 498.

